> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.tuturuuu.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Tuturuuu session slices

> Index of the implementation slices of the first-party Tuturuuu session: the pure token signer, step-up proof and device state modules, and the auth Worker and step-up page that host them.

**Status: design, pending independent security review.** These slices build on
the portable core in `packages/session` described on
[Tuturuuu session](https://docs.tuturuuu.com/platform/architecture/tuturuuu-session.md). Each row names the
part of a design gate on
[Tuturuuu session rollout](https://docs.tuturuuu.com/platform/architecture/tuturuuu-session-rollout.md#design-gates)
that the slice owns; a gate closes only when every part of it has landed. No
slice adds a runtime flag or wires an app.

Slices 2a, 2b and 3 are pure modules in `packages/session`, tested without a
Workers runtime. They take time, entropy, keys and storage as injected ports.
Hosting them in a Worker or Durable Object is slice 4, which needs its own
review, because that is where deployment, routing and cost controls apply.

| Slice | Contents | Owns | Depends on |
| - | - | - | - |
| [2a Token signer](https://docs.tuturuuu.com/platform/architecture/tuturuuu-session-token-signer.md) | Key-set parsing, per-class claim profiles, minting, verification, public JWKS | G5: key denial and expiry semantics in every verifier | Core |
| [2b Step-up proof](https://docs.tuturuuu.com/platform/architecture/tuturuuu-session-step-up-proof.md) | The `ttr+stepup` profile, canonical parameters hash, verifier and consume port | Vault prerequisite (MFA unlock) | 2a |
| [3 Device state machine](https://docs.tuturuuu.com/platform/architecture/tuturuuu-session-device-state.md) | Device, session, rotation, switch, factor changes, epoch fencing, revocation, device cap and step-up grant logic | The reducer parts of G1, G2, G3, G6, G7 and G16 | Core |
| [4 Auth Worker](https://docs.tuturuuu.com/platform/architecture/tuturuuu-session-auth-worker.md) | Hosts 2a, 2b and 3 in the `auth` Worker and its Durable Objects; controls on [auth Worker controls](https://docs.tuturuuu.com/platform/architecture/tuturuuu-session-auth-worker-controls.md) and key publication on [auth Worker keys](https://docs.tuturuuu.com/platform/architecture/tuturuuu-session-auth-worker-keys.md) | Remaining parts of G1-G3, G5-G7, G16, and G8, G17, G18 | 2a, 2b, 3 |
| 5 Step-up page | Web-owned confirmation page that mints `ttr+stepup`. Not yet designed | Vault MFA unlock | 4 |

## Slices 4 and 5

Slice 4 hosts slices 2a, 2b and 3 in an `auth` Worker with `BrowserDevice`,
`UserSessions` and `SessionControl` Durable Objects, with deployment held in
`tuturuuu.ci.ts`, as designed on
[Tuturuuu session auth Worker](https://docs.tuturuuu.com/platform/architecture/tuturuuu-session-auth-worker.md).
Before any code, its design gets an independent review covering the parts the table above leaves to it, and:

* G5 revocation bounds measured end to end, including emergency `kid` denial;
* G8 stop-fence modes and fence versions;
* G17 operation accounting;
* G18 emitted-artifact and real-ingress acceptance.

Slices 2a and 3 also leave these requirements to slice 4:

* collect the publication census in the background: one report per
  registered verifier deployment, identified by the deployment id that the
  deployment itself produces (for identity, the gateway's effective mount
  inventory; for other classes, their verifier Workers), plus a public fetch
  of `/.well-known/jwks.json`. A missing, extra or duplicate report fails
  publication and stops minting for that class at the next refresh; a
  failed refresh keeps the last success only until the 300-second cap;
* persist committed key-observation rows across isolates and keep minting
  from that cache when the store errors; a key with no persisted row stays
  blocked, and a cold start with no persisted rows stops minting;
* move the AI temporary token store and `private.cross_app_tokens` onto the
  session-bound issuer contract before the first-party session mints or
  revokes through them.
* set a ceiling on distinct users' sessions per device, enforced by the
  slice 3 reducer at sign-in, before the device object is hosted, because the
  host cannot refuse a row the reducer has already committed.

Slice 5 adds the step-up confirmation page on Web and the one-time code
redemption that mints `ttr+stepup` for relying services. It is not designed
yet.

The vault's MFA unlock needs slices 2a, 2b, 3, 4 and 5. Passkey and recovery
unlock do not depend on any of them.


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