| T1 | Database dump | Ciphertext, wraps and signatures only | Metadata |
| T2 | Compromised vault API and database | Pinned vault_id, owner-set signatures, invite binding, signed records and descriptors, witness compare-and-append | Denial of service, metadata |
| T3 | API + witness compromise | Signatures still bind every key and value to authorised signers | Stale or forked view for stateless clients |
| T4 | API + share service | Strong identity unaffected | PIN identity: offline Argon2id |
| T5 | Malicious code on the vault origin | Isolated origin, CSP, Trusted Types, no third parties | Inherent to web E2EE |
| T6 | Sibling or descendant origin script | Vault passkeys at vault.tuturuuu.com, no descendant hosts, no related origins, host-only session | — |
| T7 | Stolen session or password + TOTP | Strong unlock needs the vault passkey or recovery key; PIN guesses online within one quota | Weak PIN within the quota |
| T8 | Rogue machine approval | Fragment link from the machine’s own output, signed transcript, single approval | Owner approving without reading |
| T9 | Server substitutes a recipient key | Recipient binding, wrap digests in signed entries | Trust in the invite delivery channel |
| T10 | Server injects, swaps or rolls back values | Writer records with auth_seq, witnessed value heads, fresh checkpoints on read | — |
| T11 | Removed or downgraded principal | Atomic epoch change, write fence, history split by sensitivity, lease revocation, rotation list | Already-seen plaintext |
| T12 | Removed or compromised owner | Revocable owner keys, threshold, witnessed succession, re-genesis beyond threshold | Compromise of t owners |
| T13 | Leaked CI credential or OIDC token | CI policy on immutable IDs and SHAs, short lifetimes, atomic jti, custodial label | Delivered wraps |
| T14 | Compromised machine during lease | Memory-only, scope, TTL, revocation | Values used during the lease |
| T15 | Workload or Worker secret disclosure | Separate labelled environments, verified install target, RFC 9421 requests, atomic nonces, re-key on custody end | Custodial by design |
| T16 | Key or nonce reuse | One-time HKDF subkeys per encryption, HPKE ephemeral keys | — |
| T17 | Leaks via argv, logs, caches, crash dumps | stdin input, redaction, no plaintext caches, names-only logs | OS memory inspection |
| T18 | Audit tampering | Hash chain, audit head in witness checkpoints | Server-trusted between checkpoints |
| T19 | Library vulnerabilities | Pinned versions, RFC vectors, advisory review per change | — |
| T20 | Identity-provider migration | Constant PRF input, stable vault_user_id, vault-owned credentials | — |
| T21 | Database restore or partial write | Witness heads fence stale state; idempotent republication | Lost ciphertext reported by name |