Skip to main content
Status: design, pending independent security review. These slices build on the portable core in packages/session described on Tuturuuu session. Each row names the part of a design gate on Tuturuuu session rollout that the slice owns; a gate closes only when every part of it has landed. No slice adds a runtime flag or wires an app. Slices 2a, 2b and 3 are pure modules in packages/session, tested without a Workers runtime. They take time, entropy, keys and storage as injected ports. Hosting them in a Worker or Durable Object is slice 4, which needs its own review, because that is where deployment, routing and cost controls apply.

Slices 4 and 5

Slice 4 hosts slices 2a, 2b and 3 in an auth Worker with BrowserDevice, UserSessions and SessionControl Durable Objects, with deployment held in tuturuuu.ci.ts, as designed on Tuturuuu session auth Worker. Before any code, its design gets an independent review covering the parts the table above leaves to it, and:
  • G5 revocation bounds measured end to end, including emergency kid denial;
  • G8 stop-fence modes and fence versions;
  • G17 operation accounting;
  • G18 emitted-artifact and real-ingress acceptance.
Slices 2a and 3 also leave these requirements to slice 4:
  • collect the publication census in the background: one report per registered verifier deployment, identified by the deployment id that the deployment itself produces (for identity, the gateway’s effective mount inventory; for other classes, their verifier Workers), plus a public fetch of /.well-known/jwks.json. A missing, extra or duplicate report fails publication and stops minting for that class at the next refresh; a failed refresh keeps the last success only until the 300-second cap;
  • persist committed key-observation rows across isolates and keep minting from that cache when the store errors; a key with no persisted row stays blocked, and a cold start with no persisted rows stops minting;
  • move the AI temporary token store and private.cross_app_tokens onto the session-bound issuer contract before the first-party session mints or revokes through them.
  • set a ceiling on distinct users’ sessions per device, enforced by the slice 3 reducer at sign-in, before the device object is hosted, because the host cannot refuse a row the reducer has already committed.
Slice 5 adds the step-up confirmation page on Web and the one-time code redemption that mints ttr+stepup for relying services. It is not designed yet. The vault’s MFA unlock needs slices 2a, 2b, 3, 4 and 5. Passkey and recovery unlock do not depend on any of them.