jobs.test.ts and the
voice-jobs route.test.ts cover this admission and persistence boundary.
Jobs and artifacts are private to the requesting actor, even in team workspaces.
Every status read, creation, retry, and deletion verifies current workspace access.
Definitive loss of access denies retained artifacts. Workspace/account deletion
cascades job deletion; completed or stopped jobs can be explicitly deleted through
the job endpoint. Processing jobs must finish or enter review before deletion.
A stable request ID plus audio/time-zone digest deduplicates creation. Changed
payloads conflict. Atomic revision claims prevent duplicate provider execution.
Known preflight failures require an explicit retry against the current revision;
a successful transcript is reused when only analysis needs retry. Provider or
settlement outcomes without reliable accounting enter review required rather
than being automatically replayed or assigned an invented charge/refund.
Processing runs in a bounded Next response-tail callback. Persisted status is
recoverable after client navigation; the callback is not a durable execution queue.
Interrupted or abandoned work is marked for review after its execution window.
Clients must not automatically resubmit review-required jobs.
Regression coverage: notes-voice/audio.test.ts, jobs.test.ts, provider.test.ts,
request.test.ts, the internal API client tests, and note-voice-jobs.sql cover
input limits, metering, actor isolation, revision/retry behavior and RLS. API routes
are first-class Next handlers tracked as Rust migration backlog. Native cubit,
repository and widget regressions cover owner transitions, retry intents, retained
snapshots, denied access, real recording controls, enlarged-text review and explicit
stable-ID saves. notes_voice_host_review_test.dart verifies that a silent
completed result reaches review through the actual host action while Save remains
disabled, and that uncertain jobs cannot enter review. cache_store_scoped_removal_test.dart covers obsolete deletions
waiting for initialization/admission and durable denied-history erasure. Device
microphone/provider execution and production deployment
remain separate runtime verification gates.
Definitive Notes voice access denials write a separate secure-storage revocation
marker before attempting encrypted-cache deletion. An unreadable or denied marker
blocks cached reads after restart even when the snapshot could not be erased.
Only a validated server response whose snapshot and replica index were durably
published can clear this marker; a local pending intent cannot authorize access.
MFA challenges retain the last authorized snapshot. If both independent storage
paths fail, the current process remains blocked and reports the original denial,
but durable revocation cannot be guaranteed while all persistence is unavailable.
Regression coverage: notes_voice_revocation_test.dart exercises real encrypted
cache failures/restart, failed publication, scoped ordering, and MFA retention.