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The public schema is reachable by every browser, mobile client and holder of the anon key through PostgREST. Row Level Security is the fence for every table that still grants client roles, so one missing or permissive policy exposes a table. 20260522172925_harden_proxy_only_public_tables.sql revoked the public default privileges on tables, sequences and functions for current_user, postgres and the supabase_* owner roles the migration role belongs to. 20261027151200_restrict_anon_definer_execute.sql can re-grant default function EXECUTE to authenticated or service_role where that access came from the implicit global PUBLIC default. Platform-owned default ACLs (owner supabase_admin) still grant client roles in a full local replay; those apply only to objects that role creates. The target is a public schema with no application relations. Application data lives in private, which anon and authenticated cannot use, and clients reach it only through server routes that authorize the actor first. This page is the plan. It applies no migration and is not production authorization: every production database change in it needs its own approval (see Approvals).

Current state

Inventory from checked-in source on 2026-11-17 (generated types in packages/types/src/supabase.ts, migrations in apps/database/supabase/migrations). Generated types are a source snapshot; confirm hosted catalog state on a disposable replay before each wave. The move is an established pattern: 65 migrations named *private* (for example 20260521155712_move_more_tables_private.sql and 20260528141100_move_inventory_tables_private.sql) moved tables with ALTER TABLE … SET SCHEMA private, revoked client roles, added a service_role policy and re-pinned dependent function search_paths. private is listed in [api].schemas (apps/database/supabase/config.toml) so the server can call .schema('private'), while USAGE is revoked from public, anon and authenticated. 569 source files already use .schema('private').

Direct callers

Lexical scan of .from('<table>') and .rpc('<fn>') in apps/* and packages/* (TypeScript, excluding tests, backend, tanstack-web), Dart in apps/mobile/lib, and Python in apps/discord. A file is classified as:
  • browser: a 'use client' module or one that imports the browser Supabase client;
  • rls: a server module without an admin client, so the query runs as the user and depends on RLS;
  • admin: a server module that creates a service-role client.
The per-table classification is in the appendix. no-ts-caller means no lexical TypeScript, Dart or Python caller; such tables can still be read by SQL functions, triggers or views, so check pg_depend and function bodies before treating them as dead.

Sensitivity classes

  1. Secrets, credentials and auth state: encrypted secrets, OAuth tokens, API keys, mail credentials, payment provider connections, QR login, abuse/suspension controls, platform roles.
  2. Billing and money: subscriptions, credit balances, invoices, wallets, transactions, payroll/compensation.
  3. Mail and PII: sent mail, audit, blacklists, notifications and push devices, inquiries and feedback, user and workspace-user profiles.
  4. Workspace content: AI chats, meeting AI, Mira, tasks, time tracking, calendars, courses, quizzes, external projects.
  5. Public catalogs: changelog, holidays, exchange rates, short links, public polls and Meet Together plans.

Target pattern

Data access

  • Tables and views live in private, ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY, with one FOR ALL TO service_role policy and REVOKE ALL … FROM public, anon, authenticated. Views are security_invoker.
  • Server routes own access. Each route resolves the actor, checks workspace membership and permission with the request-scoped client, then uses the admin client on private and keeps every child read and write scoped to the verified workspace. Shared data access stays in packages/internal-api and the domain *-core packages; framework adapters inject the client. New handlers go under apps/web/src/app/api/**, not legacy-api-routes/**.
  • RPCs. A function that touches only private tables moves to private, executable by service_role only. Functions that rely on auth.uid() take an explicit p_actor_id the server resolves, and keep their internal workspace checks. A public function survives only on the guard’s function allowlist (see Guard) with an auth.uid() check, pinned search_path ending in pg_temp, and explicit grants.
  • Rollout fallback. Production migrations apply after the production deployment marker, so code ships before the move. Each moved table is read through a helper that targets private first and falls back to public on 42P01, PGRST106 or PGRST205, caching the resolved schema per process (precedent: packages/education-core/src/education/private-quiz-answers.ts). The fallback is removed in the next wave once the move is confirmed in production. Rollback of a move therefore needs no code deploy.

Compatibility views

Do not create client-granted compatibility views in public. A security_invoker view fails once the client loses private access, and a definer view re-creates the exposure. The only allowed form is a service_role-only public.<name> view over private.<name> when a service-role caller (for example the Discord bot) cannot ship in time, recorded on the allowlist with an expiry wave. Mobile compatibility comes from the release window, not from views.

Realtime

Clients keep subscribing to private Broadcast channels with the server-issued join ticket. Mutating routes publish after commit (server fan-out through Realtime broadcast or the owning Durable Object). Moving a table never adds a postgres_changes subscription; the browser session-surface guard keeps that count at 0. Each wave removes its moved tables from the supabase_realtime publication after confirming no subscriber in the realtime log aggregation.

Mobile and SDK

  • Each mobile table gets a versioned /api/v1/... endpoint and a check-mobile-api-mappings entry. The app switches in one release (Mobile release M1) shipped before Wave 2.
  • Revocation of a mobile table waits until the version-check minimum supported version is at or above M1 and the old-version share of authenticated traffic is below the agreed threshold (default: under 2% for 14 days).
  • The SDK is unaffected at the data layer. Any route whose response shape changes keeps the old shape for one minor SDK release.

RLS helpers and storage policies

Policies run as the querying role. Once a table is private, any public policy, view or invoker function that reads it fails for authenticated. Per wave:
  1. On a disposable full replay, list dependents with pg_depend and scan pg_proc.prosrc for the table name (PL/pgSQL bodies are not tracked by pg_depend).
  2. Re-pin dependent function search_path to public, private, pg_temp or qualify references.
  3. Membership and permission helpers that client-facing policies still need (storage workspaces bucket, any remaining client RLS) move to a non-exposed helper schema, following workspace_storage: not in [api].schemas, USAGE granted to authenticated, functions SECURITY DEFINER with pinned path and EXECUTE only for the roles their policies run as.
  4. Re-run security-definer-search-paths.sql, security-definer-policy-callers.sql and workspace-storage-least-privilege-rls.sql.

Generated types

bun sb:typegen already emits public,private,storage. After each local apply, regenerate and commit; shared row aliases in packages/types/src/db.ts point at Database['private']['Tables'][…]. Never hand-edit generated files.

Wave mechanics

Every wave runs the same three phases. Each phase is a separate commit set. Phase B of wave N+1 and phase C of wave N can share one migration batch and one approval. Migration rules:
  • SET SCHEMA takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock briefly: set lock_timeout (for example '3s') and keep each table move short. Keep DDL, constraint validation and concurrent index work in separate files.
  • Capture ACLs including grantors and grant options, policy definitions and function definitions before the change so the rollback restores exactly. Never re-grant PUBLIC or anon in a rollback that did not have them.
  • Migrations that touch pg_cron targets execute the stored cron.job.command on the disposable chain.
  • Apply locally (bun sb:reset) through ttr resources run, then typegen. Production runs only through supabase-production.yaml after the staging marker; never bun sb:push.

Tests per wave

  • pgTAP private-schema-client-denial.sql (new, extended each wave): for every relation in private, has_table_privilege is false for anon and authenticated on SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE; has_schema_privilege on private USAGE is false for both; every function in private is not executable by PUBLIC, anon or authenticated; each wave’s tables exist in private and not in public.
  • HTTP denial check against local PostgREST: anon key and a user JWT get PGRST205/404 for /rest/v1/<t> and a permission error with Accept-Profile: private.
  • Source “no direct client access” check (part of the guard): no moved table appears in a browser module, a Dart .from(...), a Python .table(...) without schema("private"), or a TypeScript .from(...) without a preceding .schema('private') or the fallback helper.
  • Focused route tests for every changed route (authorization 401/403/500 mapping, workspace scoping, actor stamping) and the existing domain pgTAP suites for moved RPCs.
  • Mobile: repository tests against the new endpoints; flutter gen-l10n only if strings change.
  • Exact-commit CI: Web build and each touched satellite build, type-check, lint, test. No local builds.

Waves

ETAs are focused agent-days for implementation, review and verification, excluding store review and approval waits. Waves 5, 6 and 7 are independent and can run in parallel lanes after Wave 4. Total: about 64 agent-days serial; about 40 with Waves 5–7 parallel. Add production approval latency per batch and one mobile store cycle (M1) that runs during Waves 0–1.

Wave 0: guard and foundations

  • Land the guard with the full current allowlist (no table moves).
  • Run the read-only hosted catalog check (default ACLs in public, RLS-off tables, and client grants on them) on staging, then production. Add a default-privilege migration only if the hosted result shows client grants the guard cannot exempt. It loops over the same owner roles as 20260522172925, snapshots pg_default_acl before and after, and needs approval.
  • Add the pgTAP denial test, the HTTP denial check and the private-first fallback helper in @tuturuuu/supabase (with tests).
  • Start mobile M1: endpoints for the 6 mobile tables, Flutter repository switch, minimum-version plan.
  • Security review of the guard and any default-privilege migration.

Wave 1: secrets, credentials, abuse controls

Tables: workspace_secrets, workspace_encryption_keys, calendar_auth_tokens, calendar_connections, calendar_sync_*, workspace_calendar_sync_coordination, workspace_email_credentials, workspace_api_keys, workspace_api_key_usage_logs, sepay_*, discord_integrations, qr_login_challenges, live_api_sessions, blocked_ips, abuse_*, rate_limit_appeals, user_suspensions, platform_*, workspace_domains, realtime_log_aggregations, internal_emails.
  • Most callers are already admin-backed; user-client readers of workspace_secrets (in 9 apps/packages) move to a shared server helper that returns only the needed non-secret flags.
  • Keep the credential-filter rule: never filter by token values in PostgREST URLs (oauth-credential-url-filter.test.ts).
  • platform_user_roles has one browser reader; replace with a server-resolved capability.
  • Discord bot switches discord_integrations to schema("private").

Wave 2: billing, credits, finance

Tables: subscriptions, credit packs, orders, credit_wallets, ai_credit_*, workspace_ai_credit_balances, workspace_ai_executions, fee_lock*, finance_*, wallet_*, transaction_*, recurring_transactions, workspace_wallet_transfers, workspace_role_wallet_whitelist, currency_exchange_rates, products and stock, workforce_*, and the finance views.
  • apps/finance reads mostly on the user client; move those reads to packages/finance-core / packages/apis services that authorize then use the admin client. Browser readers (finance_invoices, wallet_transactions, subscriptions, credit packs, orders) use internal-api routes.
  • The three get_finance_invoice_*_by_workspace browser RPCs and get_user_workspace_subscription_info move behind routes.
  • Payment webhooks (Polar, SePay) are already service-role; only the schema qualifier changes.
  • Phase B for wallet_transactions waits for the M1 minimum-version gate.

Wave 3: mail, notifications, inbound messages

Tables: sent_emails, email_audit, email_blacklist, post_email_queue, notifications, notification_preferences, notification_push_devices, workspace_email_invites, workspace_email_invite_roles, support_inquiries, user_feedbacks, group_users_with_post_checks.
  • Remove notifications and notification_preferences from supabase_realtime; notification delivery is server-owned (packages/ui/src/hooks/notification-subscription.ts).
  • Email invite browser modules move to the invite routes shared with Wave 8.

Wave 4: people and identity PII

Tables: users, user_private_details, handles, onboarding_progress, user_configs, workspace_users, workspace_user_*, user_group_*, workspace_user_groups*, user_indicators, guest_users_lead_generation, tulearn_parent_*, and the attendance/group views.
  • Largest PII surface. users and user_private_details have browser readers in shared UI (profile, settings, account switcher); serve them from packages/users-core routes.
  • Auth triggers that write users / user_private_details on sign-up must be re-pinned and tested on the full replay with GoTrue fixtures.
  • Phase B for user_private_details waits for the M1 gate.
  • workspace_user_linked_users is read by RLS policies on other tables; move its lookups into the helper schema first.

Wave 5: AI, meetings, memory content

Tables: ai_chat*, ai_model_favorites, workspace_ai_models, workspace_ai_prompts, meet_ai_*, mira_*, audio_chunks, recording_sessions, workspace_meetings, workspace_meet_settings, hive_*, aurora_*, crawled_*, notes, workspace_documents, workspace_whiteboards, workspace_dataset*, workspace_chat_*.
  • Memory tables keep provenance, consent and deletion fences; the move changes location only.
  • 15 tables have no application caller (hive_* runtime tables, legacy workspace_chat_*). Confirm with pg_depend and function-body scans; move them (not drop) in this wave, and propose drops separately.

Wave 6: tasks, time, calendar content

Tables: tasks, task_*, workspace_boards, board_template*, workspace_task_*, user_board_list_overrides, time_tracking_*, workspace_break_types, habit_*, workspace_habit*, workspace_calendar_*, workspace_cron_*, calendar_event_colors.
  • The held board-sprint migrations create task_sprint_reports (recorded under typesAhead) and any other sprint table in private; the sprint routes read them through .schema('private'). The guard fails a public creation.
  • Largest code surface (apps/tasks, packages/tasks-api, packages/tasks-ui, apps/calendar, apps/track). Browser modules in apps/tasks and packages/tasks-ui move to internal-api first.
  • Remove workspace_task_labels and other task tables from supabase_realtime; board updates use broadcast fan-out.
  • Task share links and task_board_public_links serve anonymous readers through server routes.
  • Discord bot switches boards, lists, tasks, assignees and time tracking.

Wave 7: education, external projects, public catalogs

Tables: course_*, workspace_course_*, workspace_quiz*, quiz_*, workspace_flashcards, tulearn_*, canonical_external_projects, workspace_external_project_*, discord_guild_members, meet_together_*, poll*, shortened_links*, link_analytics*, workspace_link_counts, changelog_entries, vietnamese_holidays.
  • Anonymous readers (changelog, short-link redirects, Meet Together guests, polls, published external projects) get cached server endpoints. Short-link redirects keep their latency budget; verify on staging.

Wave 8: workspace core and RBAC

Tables: workspaces, workspace_members, workspace_members_and_invites, workspace_invites, workspace_invite_*, workspace_guests, workspace_guest_permissions, workspace_roles, workspace_role_*, workspace_default_permissions, workspace_settings, workspace_configs, user_workspace_configs, workspace_ownership_transfers, workspace_teams, audit_logs.
  • Every remaining client policy and storage policy depends on these. Move the membership and permission helpers (including has_workspace_permission, called from browser modules) to the helper schema before Phase B.
  • Phase B for the four mobile tables waits for the M1 gate.
  • Run the full storage RLS suite and an exact-commit E2E pass on staging before approval.

Wave 9: functions and views sweep

  • Every remaining public function either moves to private or is on the function allowlist with a reason.
  • The guard enables function enforcement and the relation allowlist is empty.
  • Remove the private-first fallback helper callers; the guard then fails on any fallback use.

Approvals and review

  • Security review (Selene) for: the guard spec and Wave 0 migration; each wave’s Phase B and C migrations, rollback migration and helper-schema changes; any allowlist addition. Review uses the exact migration SHA.
  • User approval (D138) for every production database change. Batch to limit dialogs: Wave 0 default privileges (only if needed); then one dialog per batch of “Phase C of wave N + Phase B of wave N+1”. Each dialog states the tables, the exact SHA, the staging marker, the rollback migration and the evidence (pgTAP, HTTP denial, exact-commit CI).
  • Batch migration merges per wave: one combined disposable rehearsal, back-to-back merges, one staging marker, one production sync.
  • Production evidence: the supabase-production.yaml exact-SHA result, a post-apply catalog check (tables in private, no client privileges), and a watch of 4xx/5xx rates on the affected routes. A skipped or failed workflow is a blocker.

Guard: no new public relations

Two layers share the allowlist apps/database/public-schema-allowlist.json:

Allowlist

  • relations holds every application table and view in public (320), each tagged with its wave.
  • typesAhead records relations the generated types declare ahead of their migration, each with an owner, wave, reason and hosted evidence. The types check accepts them; the catalog check fails if one appears in public, so the migration that creates it must use private. An entry can only narrow an allowlisted relation, and it becomes stale once the types drop it.
  • Moving a relation removes it from relations and records it in moved ({ "wave": n, "schema": "private" }). Moved records are permanent.
  • serviceRoleCompatViews entries carry expiresAfterWave and target: "private.<name>".
  • defaultAclExemptOwners lists default-ACL owners the migration role cannot alter, each with a reason; their client grants are reported as warnings. platformObjects and clientViewExceptions are shrink-only; the change that introduces either field may populate it.
  • The allowlist path is listed in CODEOWNERS for database and security owners.

Catalog checks (authoritative)

One read-only statement reads pg_class, pg_depend and pg_default_acl (extension-owned relations excluded) and fails on:
  1. G1, equality. Every application table and view in public is in relations with the matching kind, and every entry exists. No typesAhead name exists in public. Every moved name exists in private and not in public.
  2. G2, exposure. Every public table has RLS enabled. No RLS-off table grants anon, authenticated or PUBLIC. No public or global default ACL grants those roles on tables or sequences, or function EXECUTE to anon or PUBLIC. Default EXECUTE for authenticated is a warning until functions.enforced is true, then an error. Exempt owners warn.
  3. F1, platform owners. Any public relation or function owned by a defaultAclExemptOwners role is an error unless recorded in platformObjects (relation:<name> or function:<name>(<args>), each with a reason). Stale records fail.
  4. F2, client views. A public view granted to a client role must have security_invoker=true or a reasoned clientViewExceptions entry. Stale entries fail.
  5. G5, compat views. Each serviceRoleCompatViews entry exists as a plain view, grants no client role, reads only its target, and has not expired (expiresAfterWave ≥ currentWave).
The workflow uploads the catalog JSON as an artifact for review.

Static checks

  1. Shrink-only (G3 fail closed). The allowlist is compared with the one at the base: PUBLIC_SCHEMA_BASE_SHA (CI pushes pass the previous main SHA), else the pull request base, else the merge-base with origin/main. Adding a relation, function or exempt owner fails; removing a relation without a moved record fails; currentWave cannot decrease; lintAfterVersion cannot move later; function enforcement cannot be turned off. An unreadable base or base allowlist exits 2. The only exception is the introducing change, whose base has neither the allowlist nor the guard script.
  2. Generated types. Every public table and view in packages/types/src/supabase.ts is allowlisted with the matching kind. Absence from the types is not treated as staleness: committed types can lag the chain, so the catalog owns that direction.
  3. Migration lint over migrations after lintAfterVersion, comments removed. It fails on a public (qualified, quoted or unqualified) target that is not allowlisted for CREATE [UNLOGGED] TABLE (including PARTITION OF and AS), CREATE [MATERIALIZED|RECURSIVE] VIEW, CREATE FOREIGN TABLE, SELECT … INTO, SET SCHEMA public and RENAME TO; on literal client-role GRANTs on public relations or ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public; and on client default privileges in public. Text inside dollar-quoted bodies is scanned for creation (EXECUTE 'create table …'). Temporary relations, search_path-qualified private targets and dynamic %I targets are left to the catalog check. New public functions warn until functions.enforced.
  4. Direct client access to moved relations: any browser-module reference, any Dart .from() in apps/mobile/lib, any Python .table() in apps/discord without schema("private"), and any TypeScript .from() not immediately chained from .schema('private').
Exit codes for both layers: 0 pass, 1 violation, 2 setup or parse error.

Tests

scripts/check-public-schema-objects.test.js covers each statement kind, quoting, comments, dollar-quoted bodies, temporary relations, search_path, dynamic targets, grants and default privileges, function warnings, every shrink rule, compat-view expiry, the caller rules, and fail-closed base resolution in a temporary repository. apps/database/scripts/public-schema-catalog.test.mjs covers G1, G2 and G5 on catalog fixtures and fail-closed output parsing.

Replay findings

The first full replay matched the allowlist except for three findings, all resolved in the allowlist:
  • workspace_external_project_page_versions is created in public by 20261109010100 and is missing from the committed types.
  • task_sprint_reports is declared in the types and has no migration. The production readback confirms it is absent there too, so it is recorded under typesAhead.
  • supabase_admin default ACLs in public grant anon and authenticated on tables, sequences and functions; the owner is exempt pending the hosted catalog result.
Every replayed public table has RLS enabled. In the replay all 320 public relations and 650 functions are owned by postgres, and all 26 client-granted views use security_invoker, so platformObjects and clientViewExceptions start empty. 254 public relations (228 tables and 26 views) still grant client roles behind RLS or security_invoker; the waves remove those grants. The production readback (2026-11-17) matches: 320 relations (293 tables and 27 views), all owned by postgres, no RLS-off tables, and the same client grants relation for relation as the replay.

Appendix: table inventory

Counts are distinct apps or packages per caller class from the lexical scan. mobile and discord mark direct Flutter and Python access.
abuse_activity_signals (rls:1); abuse_events (rls:2, admin:2); abuse_reputation_subjects (rls:1); abuse_step_up_challenges (rls:1, admin:1); abuse_trust_overrides (rls:1); blocked_ips (rls:2, admin:1); calendar_auth_tokens (rls:4, admin:4); calendar_connections (rls:3, admin:4); calendar_sync_dashboard (rls:3, admin:1); calendar_sync_states (no-ts-caller); discord_integrations (discord, rls:2, admin:2); internal_emails (rls:1, admin:1); live_api_sessions (rls:1, admin:1); platform_email_roles (admin:2); platform_entity_creation_limits (admin:1); platform_user_roles (browser:1, rls:3, admin:4); qr_login_challenges (admin:4); rate_limit_appeals (rls:1, admin:1); realtime_log_aggregations (rls:1); sepay_connections (rls:2, admin:2); sepay_wallet_links (admin:2); sepay_webhook_endpoints (rls:2, admin:2); sepay_webhook_events (admin:2); user_suspensions (admin:2); workspace_api_key_usage_logs (rls:2, admin:3); workspace_api_keys (rls:2, admin:4); workspace_calendar_sync_coordination (browser:1); workspace_domains (rls:1); workspace_email_credentials (rls:4, admin:4); workspace_encryption_keys (admin:8); workspace_secrets (rls:9, admin:17).
ai_credit_feature_access (rls:1); ai_credit_plan_allocations (rls:2, admin:5); ai_credit_transactions (rls:4, admin:2); credit_wallets (rls:1); currency_exchange_rates (rls:1, admin:3); distinct_invoice_creators (view, no-ts-caller); distinct_transaction_creators (view, rls:1); fee_lock_events (rls:1); fee_lock_invoice_links (rls:1); fee_lock_lines (rls:1); fee_lock_revisions (rls:1); fee_locks (rls:1); fee_notice_templates (rls:1); finance_budgets (rls:1); finance_invoice_products (rls:2, admin:4); finance_invoice_promotions (rls:1, admin:3); finance_invoice_user_groups (rls:1); finance_invoices (browser:1, rls:3, admin:8); product_categories (rls:3, admin:4); product_stock_changes (rls:4, admin:2); recurring_transactions (rls:1); transaction_categories (rls:7, admin:6); transaction_tags (rls:2, admin:2); user_group_linked_products (rls:1, admin:3); wallet_interest_configs (rls:1); wallet_interest_rates (rls:1); wallet_transaction_tags (rls:1, admin:4); wallet_transactions (mobile, browser:1, rls:4, admin:7); wallet_transactions_secure (view, no-ts-caller); wallet_types (no-ts-caller); workforce_benefits (no-ts-caller); workforce_compensation (no-ts-caller); workforce_contracts (rls:1); workspace_ai_credit_balances (rls:1, admin:1); workspace_ai_executions (admin:3); workspace_credit_pack_purchases (browser:1, rls:1, admin:1); workspace_orders (browser:1, rls:1); workspace_products (rls:4, admin:4); workspace_role_wallet_whitelist (rls:2, admin:1); workspace_subscriptions (browser:3, rls:3, admin:5); workspace_wallet_transfers (rls:1, admin:2).
email_audit (browser:1, rls:3, admin:3); email_blacklist (browser:1, rls:3, admin:1); group_users_with_post_checks (view, no-ts-caller); notification_preferences (rls:1, admin:1); notification_push_devices (rls:1, admin:2); notifications (rls:2, admin:2); post_email_queue (rls:3, admin:3); sent_emails (rls:3, admin:3); support_inquiries (admin:3); user_feedbacks (rls:1, admin:3); workspace_email_invite_roles (no-ts-caller); workspace_email_invites (browser:2, rls:4, admin:2).
group_user_with_attendance (view, no-ts-caller); group_with_attendance (view, no-ts-caller); guest_users_lead_generation (no-ts-caller); handles (no-ts-caller); onboarding_progress (browser:1, rls:1, admin:1); tulearn_parent_invites (rls:1); tulearn_parent_student_links (rls:1, admin:2); user_configs (admin:3); user_group_attendance (rls:3, admin:4); user_group_metrics (rls:2, admin:4); user_groups_with_tags (view, no-ts-caller); user_indicators (rls:1, admin:5); user_private_details (mobile, browser:6, rls:12, admin:11); users (browser:5, rls:10, admin:13); workspace_default_included_user_groups (no-ts-caller); workspace_user_fields (admin:2); workspace_user_group_tag_groups (rls:1, admin:3); workspace_user_group_tags (rls:3, admin:3); workspace_user_groups (rls:5, admin:10); workspace_user_groups_users (rls:5, admin:5); workspace_user_groups_with_amount (view, admin:1); workspace_user_groups_with_guest (view, admin:2); workspace_user_linked_users (rls:11, admin:10); workspace_user_profile_link_submissions (admin:1); workspace_user_profile_links (admin:1); workspace_user_profile_links_with_stats (view, admin:1); workspace_user_status_changes (admin:3); workspace_users (browser:1, rls:9, admin:8); workspace_users_with_groups (view, no-ts-caller).
ai_chat_messages (rls:3, admin:5); ai_chats (browser:1, rls:4, admin:4); ai_model_favorites (rls:1); audio_chunks (admin:1); aurora_ml_forecast (admin:1); aurora_ml_metrics (admin:1); aurora_statistical_forecast (admin:1); aurora_statistical_metrics (admin:1); crawled_url_next_urls (rls:1, admin:2); crawled_urls (rls:1, admin:2); entity_limit_source__workspace_whiteboards (view, no-ts-caller); hive_members (admin:2); hive_npc_memories (no-ts-caller); hive_npc_runs (no-ts-caller); hive_npcs (no-ts-caller); hive_research_session_events (no-ts-caller); hive_research_sessions (no-ts-caller); hive_servers (no-ts-caller); hive_workflow_runs (no-ts-caller); hive_workflows (no-ts-caller); hive_world_events (no-ts-caller); hive_world_states (no-ts-caller); meet_ai_chunks (rls:1, admin:1); meet_ai_memories (admin:1); meet_ai_sessions (rls:1, admin:1); meet_ai_user_preferences (admin:1); mira_daily_stats (rls:2, admin:1); mira_focus_sessions (rls:1, admin:1); mira_memories (admin:1); mira_pets (rls:2, admin:1); mira_soul (rls:2); mira_user_accessories (admin:1); mira_user_achievements (admin:1); notes (rls:2, admin:2); recording_sessions (rls:1, admin:1); workspace_ai_models (rls:2, admin:2); workspace_ai_prompts (rls:1, admin:2); workspace_chat_channels (no-ts-caller); workspace_chat_messages (no-ts-caller); workspace_chat_participants (no-ts-caller); workspace_chat_typing_indicators (no-ts-caller); workspace_dataset_cells (rls:2); workspace_dataset_columns (rls:2, admin:1); workspace_dataset_row_cells (view, rls:2); workspace_dataset_rows (rls:2, admin:1); workspace_datasets (rls:2, admin:2); workspace_documents (rls:2, admin:2); workspace_meet_settings (no-ts-caller); workspace_meetings (rls:2, admin:4); workspace_whiteboards (rls:1, admin:1).
board_template_shares (rls:2); board_templates (browser:1, rls:3, admin:3); calendar_event_colors (no-ts-caller); entity_limit_source__tasks (view, no-ts-caller); habit_calendar_events (rls:3, admin:2); habit_completions (rls:3, admin:1); habit_skipped_occurrences (rls:3); task_assignees (discord, browser:1, rls:4, admin:3); task_board_public_links (admin:1); task_board_shares (browser:1, rls:4, admin:4); task_board_status_templates (admin:1); task_calendar_events (browser:1, rls:3, admin:3); task_capacity_rule_labels (no-ts-caller); task_capacity_rule_lists (no-ts-caller); task_capacity_rule_projects (no-ts-caller); task_capacity_rules (rls:1); task_cycle_tasks (admin:1); task_cycles (rls:2, admin:1); task_drafts (rls:1, admin:1); task_history (rls:1, admin:1); task_initiatives (admin:2); task_labels (browser:1, rls:2, admin:2); task_leaderboard_members (rls:1, admin:1); task_leaderboard_teams (rls:1); task_leaderboards (rls:1); task_lists (discord, browser:2, rls:5, admin:5); task_plan_items (rls:1); task_plan_shares (rls:1); task_plan_workspaces (rls:1, admin:1); task_plans (rls:1, admin:1); task_profile_progress_settings (no-ts-caller); task_progress_achievements (rls:1, admin:1); task_progress_entries (rls:1, admin:1); task_progress_goals (rls:1, admin:1); task_progress_metrics (rls:1, admin:1); task_progress_user_achievements (rls:1, admin:1); task_progress_user_stats (admin:1); task_project_initiatives (admin:1); task_project_tasks (browser:1, rls:2, admin:2); task_project_update_attachments (rls:1); task_project_update_comments (rls:1, admin:1); task_project_update_reactions (rls:1); task_project_updates (rls:1, admin:1); task_projects (browser:1, rls:3, admin:5); task_relationships (rls:1, admin:1); task_share_link_uses (admin:1); task_share_links (rls:1, admin:1); task_shares (rls:1, admin:1); task_sprint_reports (rls:1); task_templates (no-ts-caller); task_user_override_labels (rls:1); task_user_override_projects (rls:1); task_user_overrides (rls:3, admin:2); task_user_scheduling_settings (browser:2, rls:3, admin:3); task_watchers (no-ts-caller); tasks (discord, browser:3, rls:6, admin:4); time_tracker_daily_activity (view, no-ts-caller); time_tracking_breaks (rls:2, admin:3); time_tracking_categories (rls:4, admin:2); time_tracking_goals (rls:2, admin:2); time_tracking_session_analytics (view, no-ts-caller); time_tracking_sessions (discord, rls:4, admin:4); user_board_list_overrides (rls:1, admin:1); workspace_boards (discord, browser:3, rls:4, admin:3); workspace_break_types (rls:2, admin:2); workspace_calendar_categories (admin:1); workspace_calendar_events (browser:1, rls:6, admin:10); workspace_calendar_hour_settings (rls:3); workspace_cron_executions (rls:1); workspace_cron_jobs (rls:1, admin:2); workspace_habit_tracker_entries (rls:1); workspace_habit_tracker_entry_receipts (no-ts-caller); workspace_habit_tracker_streak_actions (rls:1); workspace_habit_trackers (rls:1); workspace_habits (rls:3, admin:4); workspace_task_labels (browser:1, rls:3, admin:3); workspace_task_reminder_settings (admin:1).
canonical_external_projects (rls:2, admin:3); changelog_entries (rls:2, admin:2); course_certificates (no-ts-caller); course_module_completion_status (rls:1, admin:1); course_module_flashcards (rls:1, admin:3); course_module_quiz_sets (rls:1, admin:3); course_module_quiz_submissions (rls:2, admin:2); course_module_quizzes (rls:2, admin:3); course_test_attempt_answers (rls:1); course_test_attempts (rls:1, admin:1); course_test_modules (no-ts-caller); course_test_quizzes (rls:2); course_tests (rls:1, admin:1); discord_guild_members (discord, rls:3); link_analytics (admin:2); link_analytics_device_insights (view, no-ts-caller); link_analytics_geo_insights (view, no-ts-caller); link_analytics_summary (view, admin:1); meet_together_finalized_timeframes (admin:1); meet_together_guest_timeblocks (admin:3); meet_together_guests (rls:1, admin:1); meet_together_plans (discord, rls:1, admin:4); meet_together_user_timeblocks (admin:3); meet_together_users (view, admin:2); poll_guest_votes (admin:3); poll_options (admin:3); poll_user_votes (admin:3); polls (admin:3); quiz_options (rls:1, admin:2); quiz_set_quizzes (rls:1, admin:1); shortened_links (discord, admin:3); shortened_links_creator_stats (view, admin:1); shortened_links_domain_stats (view, admin:1); tulearn_gamification_events (no-ts-caller); tulearn_learner_state (admin:1); vietnamese_holidays (rls:2); workspace_course_module_groups (rls:1, admin:1); workspace_course_modules (browser:2, rls:2, admin:3); workspace_external_project_assets (rls:1, admin:3); workspace_external_project_binding_audits (rls:2, admin:3); workspace_external_project_bindings (rls:2, admin:3); workspace_external_project_blocks (admin:3); workspace_external_project_collections (admin:3); workspace_external_project_entries (rls:1, admin:3); workspace_external_project_entry_placements (no-ts-caller); workspace_external_project_entry_relations (admin:3); workspace_external_project_entry_taxonomy_assignments (no-ts-caller); workspace_external_project_field_definitions (admin:2); workspace_external_project_import_jobs (admin:2); workspace_external_project_publish_events (admin:2); workspace_external_project_relation_definition_targets (admin:2); workspace_external_project_relation_definitions (admin:2); workspace_external_project_taxonomies (no-ts-caller); workspace_flashcards (rls:1, admin:3); workspace_link_counts (view, admin:1); workspace_quiz_attempt_answers (rls:1, admin:1); workspace_quiz_attempts (rls:1, admin:1); workspace_quiz_sets (rls:1, admin:1); workspace_quizzes (rls:2, admin:3).
audit_logs (view, no-ts-caller); entity_limit_source__workspaces (view, no-ts-caller); user_workspace_configs (rls:3, admin:1); workspace_configs (rls:9, admin:10); workspace_default_permissions (mobile, browser:1, rls:3, admin:4); workspace_guest_permissions (admin:1); workspace_guests (admin:1); workspace_invite_link_uses (admin:1); workspace_invite_links (admin:1); workspace_invite_links_with_stats (view, admin:1); workspace_invite_roles (no-ts-caller); workspace_invites (browser:2, rls:4, admin:2); workspace_members (mobile, discord, browser:3, rls:13, admin:12); workspace_members_and_invites (view, browser:1, rls:3, admin:1); workspace_ownership_transfers (no-ts-caller); workspace_role_members (mobile, browser:1, rls:4, admin:3); workspace_role_permissions (rls:1, admin:2); workspace_roles (rls:1, admin:2); workspace_settings (rls:6, admin:4); workspace_teams (no-ts-caller); workspaces (mobile, browser:7, rls:16, admin:23).