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Some secrets are verified by more than one runtime: the web project on Vercel signs, and Cloudflare Workers verify. Both sides must hold the same value, and no person, file or log should ever see it. Two workflows generate or create the value inside one job step, hand it to every destination over stdin, and read the result back by name and type.

Shared secret write

Inputs are two choices: secret and environment. There is no free-text input. Vercel variables are written sensitive on the production target, or on preview for staging. Worker names for staging carry a -staging suffix. The web family Workers are the worker entries of apps/web/cloudflare/opennext/families.json at the checked-out commit (skipping enabled: false, and auth: false for this secret). While that file does not exist the list is tuturuuu-web-api-identity. The job refuses to run unless it is dispatched on main from a commit that descends from 018eecf2 (the abuse-guard ratelimit family). In order, one step:
  1. preflight: every target Worker exists and the Cloudflare and Vercel credentials are present. Nothing is written if a Worker is missing.
  2. Generates the value with openssl rand -base64 48, masks it with ::add-mask::, and keeps it in one shell variable.
  3. Pipes it on stdin to the Vercel write, then to every Worker write.
  4. Unsets the variable.
  5. verify: Vercel has exactly one sensitive entry for the key on the target, and each Worker has exactly one secret_text binding of that name. Output is names and types only; any mismatch fails the job.
Re-running the job rotates the value everywhere. For ABUSE_GUARD_SECRET that means the Worker accepts only the new value as soon as the Worker write lands, so run it with the web deploy ready to pick up the Vercel value. The writes use the Cloudflare and Vercel REST APIs from scripts/ci/shared-secret-api.mjs, with the value only in a request body. No command line, URL, header, environment file, step output, artifact or cache holds it, and error messages carry the HTTP status and numeric provider codes only. Credentials, by name, from the protected environment: COLAB_CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN (a Cloudflare token that can edit the Workers in account e8912e2867beecc673d171907bf09649), VERCEL_TOKEN and VERCEL_ORG_ID.

Supabase family key

supabase-family-key.yaml takes action: create or action: revoke. For create it runs preflight (every selected Worker exists, and no key named cf-web-families exists), creates the key (type: secret) in the production Supabase project, masks the returned value, pipes it to SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY on each selected Worker, and reads back the key name, id and type plus each Worker secret name and type. A second run stops at preflight; it never creates a second key. If a Worker write fails after key creation, use revoke before attempting create again. Under the same protected job, revoke resolves the unique secret key by its exact mint name, cf-web-families, deletes it by ID and confirms it is absent. A missing key is already revoked. Revocation invalidates the key on every recipient immediately. Worker binding names remain in place until they are overwritten by a subsequent create. Both actions require the environment’s dedicated credential to be present. The revoke branch unsets it before calling Supabase and can run when family configs are missing. A family is selected only if supabaseSecret: true is set in apps/web/cloudflare/opennext/families.json. Routing’s enabled flag is independent. Each opted-in family config must declare its exact Worker name, the reviewed Cloudflare account and SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY as required. All family Worker configs set APP_COORDINATION_TOKEN_DISABLE_SUPABASE_FALLBACK=1 so a database key cannot sign or verify app coordination tokens. Required coordination secrets must be provisioned independently before activation. A missing or mismatched config blocks key creation for the entire set. The public-docs family stays outside this key’s recipient set. Provision the supabase-family-key GitHub environment with required reviewers, admin bypass disabled and a single custom deployment policy for the branch main. Place SUPABASE_FAMILY_KEY_CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN in that environment with Workers Scripts:Edit only for account e8912e2867beecc673d171907bf09649. The workflow uses the existing repository secret SUPABASE_ACCESS_TOKEN. Both credentials stay in the operator step, with shell tracing disabled and masking configured before the provider scripts run.

Operator token

The abuse-guard operator token (ABUSE_GUARD_OPERATOR_TOKEN, used for /control/stop, /control/resume and /control/state) is not written by these workflows. Whoever needs a copy regenerates it through the Cloudflare deploy path and keeps it in a mode 0600 file.

Regression coverage

scripts/ci/shared-secret-write.test.mjs pins the workflow contract (dispatch only, choice inputs, main guard, the commit floor, protected environments, read-only token, existing full-SHA action pins, credentials by name, mask before first use, the value only on stdin, no --value, no echo, no Wrangler) and exercises the scripts with a provider double: the value appears only in write bodies, never in URLs, headers, output or error text, and every readback fails closed on a missing, duplicate or wrongly typed entry.