Shared secret write
Inputs are two choices:secret and environment. There is no free-text input.
Vercel variables are written
sensitive on the production target, or on
preview for staging. Worker names for staging carry a -staging suffix.
The web family Workers are the worker entries of
apps/web/cloudflare/opennext/families.json at the checked-out commit (skipping
enabled: false, and auth: false for this secret). While that file does not
exist the list is tuturuuu-web-api-identity.
The job refuses to run unless it is dispatched on main from a commit that
descends from 018eecf2 (the abuse-guard ratelimit family). In order, one
step:
preflight: every target Worker exists and the Cloudflare and Vercel credentials are present. Nothing is written if a Worker is missing.- Generates the value with
openssl rand -base64 48, masks it with::add-mask::, and keeps it in one shell variable. - Pipes it on stdin to the Vercel write, then to every Worker write.
- Unsets the variable.
verify: Vercel has exactly onesensitiveentry for the key on the target, and each Worker has exactly onesecret_textbinding of that name. Output is names and types only; any mismatch fails the job.
ABUSE_GUARD_SECRET that
means the Worker accepts only the new value as soon as the Worker write lands,
so run it with the web deploy ready to pick up the Vercel value.
The writes use the Cloudflare and Vercel REST APIs from
scripts/ci/shared-secret-api.mjs, with the value only in a request body. No
command line, URL, header, environment file, step output, artifact or cache holds
it, and error messages carry the HTTP status and numeric provider codes only.
Credentials, by name, from the protected environment: COLAB_CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN
(a Cloudflare token that can edit the Workers in account
e8912e2867beecc673d171907bf09649), VERCEL_TOKEN and VERCEL_ORG_ID.
Supabase family key
supabase-family-key.yaml takes action: create or action: revoke.
For create it
runs preflight (every selected Worker exists, and no key named
cf-web-families exists), creates the key (type: secret) in the production Supabase project, masks
the returned value, pipes it to SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY on each selected Worker, and
reads back the key name, id and type plus each Worker secret name and type. A
second run stops at preflight; it never creates a second key. If a Worker write
fails after key creation, use revoke before attempting create again.
Under the same protected job, revoke resolves the unique secret key by its
exact mint name, cf-web-families, deletes it by ID and confirms it is absent.
A missing key is already revoked. Revocation invalidates the key on every
recipient immediately. Worker binding names remain in place until they are
overwritten by a subsequent create. Both actions require the environment’s
dedicated credential to be present. The revoke branch unsets it before calling
Supabase and can run when family configs are missing.
A family is selected only if supabaseSecret: true is set in
apps/web/cloudflare/opennext/families.json. Routing’s enabled flag is
independent. Each opted-in family config must declare its exact Worker name,
the reviewed Cloudflare account and SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY as required.
All family Worker configs set APP_COORDINATION_TOKEN_DISABLE_SUPABASE_FALLBACK=1
so a database key cannot sign or verify app coordination tokens. Required
coordination secrets must be provisioned independently before activation.
A missing or mismatched config blocks key creation for the entire set.
The public-docs family stays outside this key’s recipient set.
Provision the supabase-family-key GitHub environment with required reviewers,
admin bypass disabled and a single custom deployment policy for the branch
main. Place SUPABASE_FAMILY_KEY_CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN in that environment
with Workers Scripts:Edit only for account e8912e2867beecc673d171907bf09649.
The workflow uses the existing repository secret SUPABASE_ACCESS_TOKEN.
Both credentials stay in the operator step, with shell tracing disabled and
masking configured before the provider scripts run.
Operator token
The abuse-guard operator token (ABUSE_GUARD_OPERATOR_TOKEN, used for
/control/stop, /control/resume and /control/state) is not written by these
workflows. Whoever needs a copy regenerates it through the Cloudflare deploy path
and keeps it in a mode 0600 file.
Regression coverage
scripts/ci/shared-secret-write.test.mjs pins the workflow contract (dispatch
only, choice inputs, main guard, the commit floor, protected environments,
read-only token, existing full-SHA action pins, credentials by name, mask before
first use, the value only on stdin, no --value, no echo, no Wrangler) and
exercises the scripts with a provider double: the value appears only in write
bodies, never in URLs, headers, output or error text, and every readback fails
closed on a missing, duplicate or wrongly typed entry.