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MIRA helps people review consented work context and get things done through bounded plans and selected actions. This source milestone is inactive. It creates synthetic metadata plans and dry-run receipts only. Missing or unqualified authority denies admission. No Worker exports the new class, and no production binding, ingress, model, private-content reader or provider is added.

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Scope and product decisions

The portable contracts, due-job engine, review engine and SQLite adapter live in apps/coordination/src/proactive/. Future web/mobile MIRA surfaces may use them after their adapters are qualified. Paid membership does not grant autonomy. Default enablement is off. Execution rechecks personal creator/actor ownership, paid status, explicit consent, cadence, timezone/quiet hours, pause, budgets, source revisions, permission and revocation. A due occurrence is event-driven; there is no per-user idle heartbeat or new global Cron. The initial synthetic policy permits one daily occurrence per authoritative cadence, one due-job run and two plan revisions. Cross-occurrence anti-spam and budgets require an authoritative atomic adapter before activation. Local job counters alone are not an account-wide spend cap. Journal sources stay private. Plans are separate source-linked suggestions, not changes to user journals or inferred mood records. Being away may authorize specifically consented read-only research/planning. Calendar/task/finance/email mutations, purchases and sends need distinct authority. This implementation only supports the selected action record-dry-run, which calls no provider.

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Existing infrastructure census

The existing product memory service is packages/ai/src/memory/index.ts, with scope/settings, context/search, edit/forget and ingest operations. Its settings code fails closed on lookup errors; successful missing settings retain existing enabled defaults, which cannot prove explicit proactive consent. packages/internal-api/src/ai-memory.ts already exposes product settings and edit revisions. Reuse those consented services at a qualified adapter; do not build a second memory store. Current memory revisions are opaque strings, so they cannot be fabricated as the journal proposal’s numeric revision. Task reminder lifecycle checks already cover cancellation, revision and recipient watching in packages/utils/src/task-reminder-lifecycle.ts; calendar payloads already carry explicit provider/source and recoverable create identifiers. None of those existing interfaces grants this slice external mutation permission. The active source scan found no Cloudflare Workflow entrypoint or Agents SDK scheduler for this product. Hive workflow logic is not Cloudflare Workflows. A bounded deployment-workflow query found a successful coordination production run; production-filtered cron-control/devbox-control queries returned no runs. This is workflow metadata, not current hosted namespace health or measured cost.

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Functional loop and contracts

Authority.read(identity, now) returns untrusted adapter output, parsed into a strict fresh snapshot before every admission, approval and execution. unavailableAuthority denies by default. Read errors deny. The due engine pins an immutable occurrence, reserves a durable lease/run and computes private metadata only. Duplicate wakes return existing state. Expired leases become unknown outcomes without another alarm or automatic replay. Accepted-unresolved and dead-letter states remain inspectable. Provider acceptance is represented in synthetic recovery tests, not a qualified real provider protocol. A failed second authority read during plan preparation persists an inspectable blocked record without retry or another wake. A completed due receipt plus fresh scoped context creates an evidence-linked reviewable plan. Selected approval binds its revision, the only permitted action and expiry. Rejection preserves a feedback category; revision refreshes evidence and invalidates older approval scopes, within a two-revision cap. Approval and execution recheck authority and current evidence. Changed source, deletion, revocation, consent or permission versions revoke selected action. Completed dry-run activity receipts are durable and idempotent. The journal reference proposal has exactly kind, UUID actorId, UUID personalWorkspaceId, UUID sourceId, positive safe-integer sourceRevision, strict UTC ISO observedAt/expiresAt, and required safe-integer deletion, revocation and consent versions. Expiry follows observation. Missing versions never default. No body, title or mood is accepted. Adoption of the actual journal parser requires the journal owner’s reviewed file SHA and root binding. Other memory/goals/task/calendar/notification interfaces remain injected synthetic contracts with opaque string revisions, discriminated from numeric journal revisions. No unpublished internal-api module or broad admin read is imported. journal-reference.ts independently validates the reviewed canonical metadata contract, preserving numeric sourceVersion, GUID identifiers, exact millisecond UTC timestamps and positive consent versions. A root-injected parser descriptor must carry the reviewed parser SHA and return the same strict metadata. The explicit sourceVersion to internal sourceRevision alias does not coerce or default a value. Canonical GUIDs that fail the stricter internal UUID union are denied. Missing parser qualification denies even valid-looking fixtures. Returned references are synthetic-only with runtime admission denied; there is no import of the journal branch, provider or private content. An actual parser binding and union qualification remain separate root-owned work. After a confirmed authoritative correction/forget, the owning adapter must invalidate derived indices and persist the review invalidation fence before reuse. Failed deletion cannot be reported as success. This core cannot delete original journals or build a private memory index. SQLite state writes are transactional; alarm reconciliation is a separate awaited operation. Resubmitting the same immutable occurrence repairs an interrupted alarm write. Atomic state/alarm crash qualification and authenticated recovery ingress are held activation gates. Terminal fences prevent late alarms from executing work, even after cancellation or restart.

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Bounded cost assumptions

Official documentation was checked on 2026-10-12. These are illustrative assumptions, not observed usage, account spend or latency. Shared allowances, actual retries, retention overhead, logs, database and provider costs are unknown. Assume 1,000 opted-in paid users, one daily due event, 30 days: 30,000 occurrences. Disabled users emit no events. Assume five DO invocations, one active second, 10 SQLite writes, 20 reads and 2 KB retained metadata per occurrence. These counts must be measured against a qualified native runtime. Workflows pricing uses Workers request/CPU rates plus steps and storage. Steps/storage billing started August 10, 2026. Paid allowances are 10 million requests, 30 million CPU ms, 500,000 steps and 1 GB-month. Overage rates are 0.30/millionrequests,0.30/million requests, 0.02/million CPU ms, 0.80/100,000stepsand0.80/100,000 steps and 0.20/GB-month. Idle waits use no CPU; retained state still counts. With shared allowances exhausted, raw-rate scenario amounts are $0.009 + $0.06 + $1.44 + $0.024 = $1.533 before billing granularity, account minimum or other services. With all allowances available, these modeled dimensions fit within them; that does not make the account or providers free. DO pricing includes 1 million requests, 400,000 GB-s, 25 billion row reads, 50 million writes and 5 GB-month monthly on Paid. Excess rates are 0.15/millionrequests,0.15/million requests, 12.50/million GB-s, 0.001/millionreads,0.001/million reads, 1/million writes and 0.20/GB−month.Computeexcessroundsuptothenextbillableunit.Withexhaustedcomputeallowances,150,000extrarequestsroundtoonemillion,or0.20/GB-month. Compute excess rounds up to the next billable unit. With exhausted compute allowances, 150,000 extra requests round to one million, or 0.15, and 3,840 extra GB-s round to one million GB-s, or 12.50.RawSQLrateproductsare12.50. Raw SQL rate products are 0.30 writes, 0.0006readsand0.0006 reads and 0.012 storage before SKU rounding. Alarm scheduling counts as a row write; deletes count as writes and KV methods bill SQLite rows. Waiting on network I/O can keep a DO active and billed. The synthetic one-second assumption cannot be extrapolated to model calls. Workers pricing has a $5 paid-account monthly minimum and shared request/CPU allowances. Cron uses UTC schedules; it supplies neither consent nor a total spend fence. DO alarms have one slot per object, at-least-once execution and up to six automatic retries starting at two seconds. Deleting an alarm cannot replace a terminal fence. Agents schedules use SQLite and DO alarms. Count their underlying costs; the attempted standalone Agents pricing URL was unavailable, so no separate free-price claim is made. Agents limits include 30 seconds default CPU/event and 1 GB state/agent. Workflows limits include 1 MiB event/result payloads, 300 creations/second/account and 100/second/workflow on Paid. Scheduling is not authority to spend or retry external effects indefinitely.

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Verification and activation gates

Tests use fake clocks, synthetic authority and actual local SQLite. The storage seam test replaces the Cloudflare base class, so it is not native workerd/hosted DO proof. Coverage binds due admission, cancellation/replay/recovery, rollback, evidence/approval fences, bounded feedback revisions and idempotent receipts. Before activation, root must bind actual paid/personal identity, consent, permission, revocation/deletion, source and atomic budget adapters. Qualify native alarm/crash/restart behavior, operation counts and durable terminal stop fences. Require bounded strict ingress with signed tenant/audience/expiry/replay checks or scoped service-binding identity and narrow secret references. This milestone installs no endpoint or shared admin credential. Require exact-commit tests/type/lint/build CI, staging acceptance and a finite canary cost budget. Provider acceptance/unknown-outcome tests are required if a real provider is added. Root alone authorizes promotion/rollback. Rollback stops admission, persists cancellation/revocation and removes future alarms; retain and inspect unknown outcomes before replay. A rate limit, CPU cap, billing alert or redeploy alone is not a total-spend stop mechanism.