meet.tuturuuu.com, apps/meet) combines meeting planning and live
collaboration. Public product explanations live on the main site; operational
rooms, plans, and workspace meeting records are excluded from search indexing.
Choose the meeting surface
Before, during, and after a session
Before joining, verify the correct workspace/plan, participant access, and the configured meeting provider. During the call, recording, transcription, and assistant behavior follow the documented session controls and provider state. Afterward, review notes and proposed follow-ups before writing to Tasks or Calendar. A proposal is not an executed action, and a room URL is not broad workspace authority.Transcription credit admission
Live transcription bills Gemini usage to the host’s personal workspace. Each upload window is admitted against AI credits before its transcript row is reserved, so a refusal never leaves a “[Missing audio segment]” gap. A failed credit check (RPC error or unreadable result) is retried at most three times with backoff, then returns a retryable 503 that stays within the client’s five-minute recovery window. A real refusal (credits used up, daily limit, model not on the plan, or another plan restriction) is a non-retryable 402 with a client-safe reason code. Meet then stops capture, finalizes the session, and shows the specific reason in English and Vietnamese instead of the generic partial-transcript alert. Notes generation keeps its own admission check. Regression controls:server/credit-admission.test.ts,
server/chunks-credit-admission.test.ts and use-meeting-ai.test.ts under
packages/meet-core/src/features/meeting-ai.
Public authentication callback
Meet’s native app renders the tokenless/verify-token and /vi/verify-token
callback shell for exact GET and HEAD requests, including locale context, without
consuming a verification token or requiring an account session. The explicit
English locale prefix retains normal locale canonicalization. This lets a direct
callback visit render the bilingual loading/logo UI and its hydration assets.
An explicit token query parameter, including an empty value, and other methods
continue through the shared verifier; token validation, safe next destinations,
session cookies, login routing and protected routes retain their existing rules.
The exception applies only to these exact callback routes, not API or workspace
routes. Real-proxy controls live in apps/meet/src/proxy.public-callback.test.ts;
SSR, hydration assets and both locales still require the emitted Worker CI gate.
Browser language selection
When a Meet page has no supported locale in its URL or locale cookie, browser language negotiation uses valid locale tags fromAccept-Language in their
quality order. Wildcard ranges and invalid locale tags are ignored before locale
matching. If no valid preference remains, Meet uses its existing English default.
Valid regional English and Vietnamese preferences continue to select their
supported language. Zero-quality ranges remain excluded by negotiation.
A supported URL locale takes precedence over the locale cookie, which takes
precedence over the browser header. Public callbacks retain their existing locale
handling; authentication, SSO destinations and safe next-path rules are unchanged.
Real-proxy and Request-bridge regression controls live in
apps/meet/src/proxy.public-callback.test.ts. Hosted original and restored Worker
acceptance remains a separate gate.
Public login locale routing
For the exact locale-prefixed public login paths/vi/login and /en/login,
Meet uses the configured English default for as-needed prefix handling.
Explicit /vi/login continues to the login renderer with the Vietnamese locale
header, even when the locale cookie or browser language prefers English.
Explicit /en/login intentionally retains its redirect to unprefixed /login.
Unprefixed /login retains the existing cookie and browser language selection;
all other paths retain their existing locale handling.
This path-scoped rule leaves the default authentication policy, public callback
handling, token verification, session checks and branch ordering unchanged.
Central SSO continues to return through Meet’s /verify-token callback, and the
shared safe next-path guard continues to reject external destinations.
The real-proxy/bridge regressions in
apps/meet/src/proxy.public-callback.test.ts cover both login paths with absent,
English and Vietnamese headers and conflicting locale cookies, preserving the
encoded query, forwarded locale, exact callback continuation and zero fetches.
Their fixed Start SSO response establishes only proxy/bridge continuation; shared
login-page rendering and emitted original/restored Worker acceptance require
separate runtime evidence. These controls do not establish the cause of a past
hosted redirect.
Plan guest passwords and sessions
Scope: guests who join a Meet plan by name, with or without a password, on both the Meet satellite and the web-hosted plan page. Signed-in platform users are unaffected.- Storage. Guest passwords are stored with the shared server-only KDF in
@tuturuuu/utils/crypto(scrypt, encoded asscrypt$N$r$p$salt$keywith N=2^15, r=8, p=1, a 16-byte random salt and a 32-byte key). The salt lives inside the encoding, sopassword_saltis written as an empty string for new rows. Verification uses a constant-time comparison. - Credential flow. The guest submits the plaintext password over HTTPS to
the guest login server action. The server verifies it and returns a signed
guest session (
@tuturuuu/utils/meet-guest-session) bound to that guest and plan, valid for 12 hours. Availability updates and guest poll actions present that session (guestSession); the server re-verifies the signature, plan, guest and expiry, and checks that the guest still belongs to the plan. Stored password hashes are never returned to the browser and are not accepted as a credential. - Default. Passwordless guests keep working: the empty password is hashed like any other value. The saved-name auto login on reload still applies only to passwordless guests; the password and the session are not persisted.
- Plan access. Guest login, guest poll actions and guest availability writes
(create and delete) follow the anonymous plan-access rule: they run
getPlan(planId, { actorUserId: null })before any session or database work, so a guest, including one holding a session issued earlier, only reaches public, non-workspace plans. Regression coverage:packages/apis/src/meet/actions/timeblocks.test.tsandapps/web/src/app/api/v1/meet/plans/[planId]/availability/route.test.ts. - Expiry. When a session expires the guest action is rejected and the guest signs in again from the plan page.
- Attempt limits. Guest password attempts are limited per plan and guest
name and per client IP (see
shared-secret password budgets).
While a budget is spent the form shows a localized retry message, even for
the correct password. Verified logins refund one target attempt; source counters
retain the charge. The source budget is 300 attempts per 15 minutes to tolerate
shared office addresses. Creation reserves 10 attempts per plan and source
network per 15 minutes, independent of the chosen name. Different networks do
not share a plan-wide creation cap. IPv6 addresses share their /64; unknown IPs
share a bucket. Missing plans do no hashing. Creation denials use distinct
English/Vietnamese copy about attempts to join.
The optional Durable Object password store is default-off. When assigned, each
IPv4 /32, IPv6 /64 or shared unknown-source bucket, under the same pepper, may
spend at most 5% of the password family’s daily command share across
creation/login scopes, including rejected probes and successful refunds.
This bounds one bucket, not a network allocation or one actor: rotating 20 /64s
within one /48 can still drain the family. HIGH activation hold
FAIR-R1-SYBIL-DRAINremains open. Shared NATs and unknown-source callers can also exhaust their common bucket; P2FAIR-R1-SHARED-SOURCE-LOCKOUTremains open. A repeated denied reservation is cached for at most one second. See the fairness activation holds. Regression coverage:apps/abuse-guard/src/fairness.test.tsandpackages/utils/src/abuse-protection/__tests__/password-attempt-store.test.ts. The participant view and guest table are available only to server/admin clients; client roles cannot query either directly. Regression coverage lives inpackages/apis/src/meet/actions/auth.test.ts,packages/utils/src/abuse-protection/__tests__/password-attempt-limits.test.ts, andapps/database/supabase/tests/security-meet-guest-grants.sql. - Table access.
meet_together_guestskeeps row level security with no client-role policies, and client-role table grants are revoked; only server code using the service role reads it. - Signing secret. Sessions are signed with the shared server token secret
(
TUTURUUU_APP_COORDINATION_SECRET, falling back toSUPABASE_SECRET_KEY) through a purpose-derived key, so they cannot be replayed as any other token type. Rotating that secret ends all active guest sessions.
Password hash migration
- Reset markers.
verifyPasswordaccepts only thescrypt$encoding. Any other non-empty stored hash, including the legacy unprefixed salted SHA-256 hex digest, returnsresetRequired: trueand never verifies or upgrades from a submitted password. Guest sign-in returnsPASSWORD_RESET_REQUIRED, and the plan creator recovers the guest with Reset a guest password. The full policy is in shared-secret password reset. - No backfill. Legacy rows cannot be converted without the plaintext, so the existing hash format is the durable reset marker; there is no schema change, migration step or bulk update.
- Parameter rehash. When a scrypt hash with older parameters verifies,
the login request replaces it with a fresh scrypt hash using an update
filtered on the previous
password_hashvalue, so a concurrent upgrade is never overwritten. A failed upgrade is logged and the login still succeeds. - In-flight clients. Browsers holding a page from before this change send the retired hash field, which the server now rejects. Those guests see a failed save or vote and sign in again after reloading.
packages/utils/src/__tests__/crypto.test.ts,
packages/utils/src/__tests__/meet-guest-session.test.ts,
packages/apis/src/meet/actions/auth.test.ts,
packages/apis/src/meet/actions/polls.test.ts,
packages/apis/src/meet/actions/timeblocks.test.ts,
apps/web/src/app/api/v1/meet/plans/[planId]/availability/route.test.ts,
apps/meet/src/runtime/legacy-action-ports.test.ts and
apps/database/supabase/tests/security-meet-guest-grants.sql.
Runtime boundaries
Meet shares behavior throughpackages/meet-core and packages/meet-ui.
Realtime, signaling, provider connectivity, and hosted SFU/TURN are separate
boundaries. A local Worker fixture does not establish hosted media-network
success. The Meet runbook and linked call feature guide
identify the owning deployment and verification path.
Mobile workspace tools documents
native availability and opt-in defaults. Rooms and plan share links stay noindex
even when participants can join without browsing an entire workspace.
Native Worker verification
The native renderer uses TanStack Start SSR, Vite+ and the official Void SDK. Shared meeting behavior and the separate realtime Worker retain their existing ownership. Framework source or a successful build does not establish production cutover or hosted media acceptance. Preserve supplier-generatedsrc/routeTree.gen.ts bytes, including generated casts.
Meet and Calendar need owning-config formatter.includes set to
the root Oxc ignorePatterns entries for **/routeTree.gen.ts and **/*.bridge.gen.ts. Preserve generated bytes and test authored files separately.
Use bun run build:cloudflare in CI. Discover the emitted Worker configuration
through exactly one of .wrangler/deploy/config.json or Void’s saved
.void/preview-deploy-config.json; reject missing or simultaneous pointers.
Void preserves the pointer bytes when moving it, so resolve configPath from
the original .wrangler/deploy directory in either case. Do not assume an
output directory or recreate a missing pointer.
Preserve the existing Worker identity, targeted placement, bindings, secret names
and Durable Object migration history. Qualify, seal and restore the complete
output before publishing those exact bytes with the app-local Wrangler adapter.
Void CLI deployment is not interchangeable: the released CLI rebuilds, prepares
additional output and cannot preserve this targeted-placement path.
Live qualification validates the materialized input and emitted config against
Meet’s fixed resource policy and pinned supplier/parser profiles. It measures
materializer and loader-selection facts twice, rejects typed-source, input or
profile drift, and admits only explicit default representations. Empty queue
producer/consumer lists cannot authorize a queue; existing bindings, migration
history and placement remain exact. Inspect the bounded field-rejection reason
when qualification fails; diagnostic absence does not approve a value.
The schema-2 artifact seal retains the original input path/hash, platform and
qualification profile alongside exact output hashes. Restored discovery requires
the seal, external expected SHA and complete file hashes before policy checks.
It compares historical metadata without opening or rebasing the original input
path and never falls back after a malformed seal. Raw emitted config bytes stay
unchanged. This relationship does not prove historical retained-state provenance.
Regression coverage is in scripts/ci/verify-meet-start-output.test.js.
Both the original prepack dry-run and production restored dry-run use
scripts/ci/meet-dry-run-scratch.mjs from apps/meet, passing "$SOURCE_SHA".
The wrapper derives the emitted config through the existing artifact verifier,
requires its manifest and canonical output, and captures the strict directory
seal and absence of the config parent’s .wrangler and .wrangler/tmp before
running the same app-owned bun x --no-install wrangler deploy --dry-run -c
command with the discovered config and inherited environment.
Wrangler can leave empty .wrangler/tmp ancestors after removing its deploy
child. After successful child close, the wrapper accepts no residue or exactly
that empty two-directory layout. It verifies file hashes and the complete prior
layout before using nonrecursive rmdir on the leaf and then parent, and
rechecks the manifest and strict directory seal afterward. Preexisting, partial,
nonempty, linked, special or unexpected entries fail closed; command failure
preserves residue without cleanup or retry. The file manifest alone cannot
reject extra empty directories. Keep the hidden-entry allowlist, full tar
contents and launcher’s original-artifact seal unchanged. The credential-free
restored gate does not need another dry-run or rebuild.
On rejection, preserve the failed artifact/evidence for bounded inspection;
do not recursively delete scratch or normalize the archive. Syntax and source
review do not qualify this repair: require exact-commit dry-run, pack/restore,
and original/restored launcher acceptance in CI before claiming producer repair.
After qualification, collect native-emitted-config-meet.json even on failure. Keep the actual source HEAD
separate from the event SHA. Retain pointer and config hashes and a redacted key-shape inventory, never raw
configs, resource identifiers, or secret values. Unavailable or overflow diagnostics remain failures. The
receipt provides no acceptance, allowlist approval, or rollback proof. Inspect the actual receipt before
qualifying unexpected queues or configPath fields. Preserve the strict resource, saved-pointer,
native-relative-base, restore, and deployment gates.
Diagnostic receipts use schema 2 with wireEncoding: "scoped-layouts-v1" when
inventory or defaultProbe is present. Only those fields use shared ordered
layouts: [0, layoutIndex, ...values] represents an object and [1, ...items]
represents an array. Scalars and full hashes remain unchanged; optional absence,
null, false, property order and row order are preserved. Top-level status and
provenance remain readable. Use decodeReceipt from
scripts/ci/native-receipt-layout.mjs to restore the original logical schema 1;
it also accepts legacy schema-1 receipts. It rejects unsupported encodings,
malformed layouts/tags, duplicate or prototype-related layout keys, excessive
depth and expanded size. Decoding never qualifies acceptance or supplies missing
status/evidence. inventoryHash still commits to the original inventory JSON.
The complete wire receipt, including its final LF, must fit 16,384 UTF-8 bytes.
Overflow retains the existing schema-1 unavailable summary and failing exit code,
without partial diagnostics. Collection and the live default probe stay logical
objects. Regression coverage lives in native-receipt-layout.test.mjs and
native-emitted-config-receipt.test.mjs; actual emitted-payload fit requires CI
on the new commit, separately from historical and synthetic fixture coverage.
Request adapters preserve satellite sessions, locale rewrites, response cookies
and central API ownership. Native plan mutations use POST server functions with
CSRF checks and the canonical authorization suppliers. Intentional credentialed
guest actions remain scoped to the existing plan policy. Confirmed mutations
invalidate the native loader; denied or uncertain results do not report success.
The owning workflow must verify emitted server/client boundaries, bilingual SSR,
SSO redirects, logout cookies, API forwarding, static assets and Live admission.
The artifact-dependent suite is scripts/ci/meet-cloudflare-render.runtime.mjs;
it runs after building and again against the restored artifact, outside generic
source-only test discovery.
The credential-free restored-artifact job depends on validate and downloads
its exact-SHA meet-worker archive into a fresh immutable-source checkout with
frozen dependencies. Unlike the original post-build gate, it restores the
uploaded bytes without rebuilding, verifies the seal and discovers the restored
config, then runs scripts/ci/meet-native-launcher.mjs and the finite SDK checks
under the existing three-minute deadline. It retains finite graph evidence even
on failure and rechecks the manifest after acceptance. This job has only
contents: read, no production environment or account credentials, and performs
no deployment. The production job retains its own restored-runtime defense.
Workflow wiring is not an executed CI result: client-boundary source review does
not establish hydration or token completion. Provider, staging, canonical-route
and recoverable rollback acceptance remain separate requirements.
Signed-in workspace, room and plan flows, all native mutation transports and
browser hydration need independent acceptance. Preserve
an observed hosted configuration and recoverable prior Worker version before
traffic changes. Local workerd probes do not qualify hosted SFU/TURN, devices,
recording or assistant stop behavior.
Consent evidence and retention schema (M1-B)
The consent log is private server data. Neither authenticated nor anonymous clients can insert, update, or delete evidence; the server appends decisions and orders them bycreated_at DESC, id DESC. Only the service role can erase rows.
A withdrawal cannot be removed by a client to revive an earlier allow (F7).
A BEFORE UPDATE trigger also refuses privileged evidence edits; only nested server/Auth account-deletion actions
can clear user_id, retaining all other fields.
A random UUID participant_ref is minted on first consent per session/participant,
reused for later decisions in that pair, and stored only on consent rows. It is
neither a user-ID digest nor an email/name hash. Deleting an account sets the
consent user_id to NULL while retaining that random pseudonym and the evidence.
Clients cannot delete Auth accounts or trigger this anonymization. Auth account
deletion clears consent identity immediately, even though the legacy Auth trigger
retains the public profile. Later service profile erasure removes its personal
workspace after Auth deletion; consent evidence survives both steps.
These decisions apply by default to Meet and Parley session consent, including
live and recording sources, with no client-role exception. Meeting deletion and
account deletion are distinct from an explicitly authorized evidence erasure.
They do not expand transcript purge into evidence deletion. Guardian/legal
retention policy remains an independent product/legal decision.
Meeting/session deletion is refused while consent rows exist (ON DELETE RESTRICT). Only a trusted service erasure flow explicitly deletes consent rows
before deleting the session or meeting. Transcript retention purges text in place
and retains the session and consent evidence; it needs no consent erasure.
This schema does not enable audio storage.
Meet and Parley retain host-only visibility for existing sessions and callers
that omit visibility. Workspace settings default new application-created sessions
to participants, explicit per-person opt-in, an ask prompt, zero audio retention,
and 365 days of text retention. Retention is bounded to 1–365 days or NULL
(forever); audio retention is enforced at zero until audio storage is implemented.
Notice versions are capped at 80 characters. Workspace settings enforce required
account MFA in addition to membership/admin RLS. Applying workspace overrides
belongs to the server integration; adding settings does not bypass participant consent.
The M1-B migration explicitly replaces private.purge_meet_transcripts_batch:
purge_after <= now() selects expired sessions in both dry-run and delete;
NULL retains a session forever. Existing deadlines are backfilled from
coalesce(ended_at, created_at) + 365 days. New sessions default to 365 days
from creation. Purging clears both original and edited notes, and transcript
chunks; legacy recording transcripts retain their separate 365-day policy.
The migration and rollback close the purge fence and withdraw delete approval.
A database owner must approve fresh dry-run counts before enabling deletion.
The existing batch, daily, terminal-state and stop-fence limits remain in force.
Regression coverage: meet-ai-consent-schema.sql checks client denials and
withdrawal ordering;
meet-ai-consent-retention.sql
checks creator/admin deletion refusal, server erasure ordering, random pseudonym
reuse and account anonymization; required-account-mfa.sql checks MFA policy.
meet-transcript-retention-purge.sql checks custom deadlines,
forever retention, edited-note deletion, ACLs and bounded restart behavior.